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Abstract
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Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4393
Less restrictive product market policies are crucial in 
promoting convergence to higher levels of GDP per 
capita. This paper benchmarks product market policies 
in Bulgaria to those of OECD countries by estimating 
OECD indicators of Product Market Regulation (PMR). 
The PMR indicators allow a comprehensive mapping 
of policies affecting competition in product markets. 
Comparison with OECD countries reveals that Bulgaria 
has made substantial progress towards less restrictive 
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product market policies but also emphasizes a number 
of areas where further reform is needed. These include 
adoption of a regulatory process based on incentive-based 
rather than command-and-control approach, reduction 
of state interference in the decision of state-owned 
enterprises, further streamlining of business licensing 
procedures, and improvement in the communication of 
rules and procedures to affected parties. 
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INTRODUCTION  
On January 1 2007, Bulgaria became a member of the European Union.  This 
achievement was in part made possible by a substantial reform effort, which has allowed 
Bulgaria to make impressive progress towards long-term stability and sustained growth 
over the past decade.   
 
Nonetheless, the income gap with the new member states of the EU remains large, while 
competition is still burdened by overly restrictive product market policies.  In order to 
sustain growth and improve competitiveness, a second generation of reforms has been 
launched to help the country’s successful integration in EU and global markets.  A 
cornerstone of this reform agenda is the implementation of less restrictive product market 
policies that enables firms to put resources - both capital and labor - to their most 
efficient use. 
 
This paper presents a comparative analysis of Bulgaria’s performance in product market 
regulation (PMR).  The approach used relies on a methodology developed by the OECD 
(Conway, Janod and Nicoletti 2005), and the associated data, which are available for all 
OECD members and Brazil. Bulgaria, together with Romania (and now Ukraine), is one 
of the few non-OECD countries to have undertaken such a benchmarking exercise.   Data 
for Bulgaria were collected following the same methodology in early 2006.  Comparators 
include countries at similar levels of income and development, as well as high-income 
EU and OECD countries.  
 
The paper is organized as follows.  After a brief discussion of the PMR methodology, we 
present the result of benchmarking Bulgaria’s product market policies to OECD countries 
and outline the areas where divergence from the average OECD levels or selected 
comparator groups is the largest.  Although the PMR approach, and hence the paper, are 
really only diagnostic tools, we conclude by suggesting broad reform options.   
 
Not unexpectedly, we find that overall product market policies in Bulgaria are generally 
more restrictive than among OECD countries, all of which are richer and with a longer 
tradition of reviewing their policy environment to make it more conducive to private 
sector development.  Nevertheless, a number of interesting observations on the sources of 
Bulgaria’s ranking emerge from the analysis.  These can be summarized as follows: 
 
•  Bulgaria in 2006 performs better than its peers in terms of outward-oriented 
policies (meaning obstacles to international trade and foreign direct investment).  
Its policies in this domain are more liberal than those of peers such as other 
middle-income countries (Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey) and the pre-accession 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
1  In particular, substantial progress has 
been achieved in ensuring the equal treatment of foreign parties and in eliminating 
                                                 
1 The data for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak republic is from 2003, so just prior to 
their joining the EU.     4
regulatory barriers to trade and investment.  Until Bulgaria joined the EU, there 
remained an agenda around barriers to foreign investment in specific sectors and 
tariff levels, which in early 2006 were still higher in Bulgaria than in the EU, 
albeit lower than in non-EU middle-income countries.  These were brought to the 
EU level in January 2007.  
 
•  Bulgaria is most restrictive in  inward-oriented policies – meaning policies 
concerned with the degree of state control of the economy and with barriers to 
entrepreneurship.  This is due to a combination of factors:  
o  State control over the economy is still significant.  The size of the public 
enterprise sector and the extent to which the state controls strategic 
decisions of public enterprises are still somewhat higher than among 
comparator countries.  In addition, although price controls have been 
substantially reduced during the first generation of reforms, incentive-
based regulation is still not the norm. 
o  Barriers to entrepreneurship need to be further reduced, although they are 
not too distant from benchmark groups.  Actions could include:  lifting 
barriers to entry in network and utilities sectors;  further streamlining the 
licenses and permits system (notably by introducing the ‘silence is 
consent’ rule);  simplifying rules and procedures;  and alleviating 
administrative burdens on startups by simplifying the incorporation of new 
firms and further liberalizing entry in regulated service sectors, such as 
road freight and retail distribution.  
 
It should be noted that these comparisons are between Bulgaria in 2006 and comparators 
in 2003.  However, past experience shows that countries can change very rapidly in terms 
of product market policies and it is known that a number of countries have been 
reforming rapidly in recent years.  A repeat of the benchmarking exercise for Bulgaria in 
the next couple of years (for example, in the context of a planned new roll-out of the 
PMR in 2007) would permit a more exact comparison while allowing for a review of 
progress achieved in deregulating the economy since Bulgaria’s entry to the EU and 
identify potential areas for adjustment.   
 
We now turn to a presentation of the PMR methodology and a discussion of the choice of 
benchmarks, before presenting the results of the benchmarking exercise.   
 
THE PMR METHODOLOGY 
A regulatory environment propitious to competition in product markets is widely 
believed to have positive repercussions on long run economic performance (Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta 2003) and productivity convergence (Conway et al. 2006 and 2007).  This may 
occur by promoting a more efficient allocation of resources both across and within 
sectors (Nickel 1996).  A more competitive environment may also stimulate innovation 
and technological diffusion, thus enhancing dynamic efficiency (Aghion et al. 2001). 
   5
Product market regulation (PMR) is measurable through a methodology developed at the 
OECD relying on the OECD regulatory indicators questionnaire.  The methodology and 
key findings of the PMR for OECD countries are presented in Nicoletti et al. (1999) and 
Conway et al. (2005).  The PMR indicators summarize information on economy-wide 
and industry-specific regulatory provisions.  
 
The PMR indicators are designed to reflect regulations that have the potential to restrict 
competition in areas where competition is viable.  By construction, they have a number 
of features which make them useful not only for analysis, but, more importantly, for 
policy advice, since they allow to pinpoint specific policies that hamper competition in 
product markets.  First, PMR indicators are focused on enacted policies and not on 
outcomes, implying that they are ‘objective’, in that they are not based on opinion 
surveys.  Second, since the summary PMR indicator is constructed as the average of well 
defined components, PMR scores can be related to specific underlying policies, thus 
providing precise inputs in the phase of policy recommendation.  Finally, PMR indicators 
focus on regulatory measures that affect the economy at large and can therefore be 
considered as comprehensive measures of regulatory restrictiveness.  Their advantages 
notwithstanding, PMR indicators are not designed to capture informal regulatory 
practices nor the effective enforcement of regulations, since they are only concerned 
with formal compliance with a number of criteria. 
 
Data were collected for Bulgaria for the purpose of the present exercise, covering four of 
the six “sections” of the OECD product market regulation database.
2  The first section 
deals with general regulatory policy issues, concerning public ownership; market access 
and competition issues; market structure and vertical relationships in utilities and other 
network industries.  The second section covers regulatory and administrative policies, 
such as processes and capacities in the public administration.  The third section covers 
regulation in transportation industries, focusing on market access, business conduct, and 
market structure in road freight, railways and passenger air travel.  The final section 
covers regulation in retail distribution, focusing on the regulatory environment, industry 
behavior and prices.  Information from Doing Business 2006 was used for a fifth section 
of the PMR - administrative burdens on startups.   
 
The structure of the PMR system is shown in Figure 1.  The system is composed of 16 
basic or ‘low-level’ indicators, each capturing a specific aspect of the regulatory regime 
as described in Box 1.  The basic indicators are progressively aggregated in more 
comprehensive policy areas.  The highest level of aggregation corresponds to the 
summary measure of product market regulation in the country. 
 
 
                                                 
2 The OECD questionnaire adapted for Bulgaria is provided in the Annex. For a comprehensive reference 
see www.oecd.org/eco/pmr.   6
Figure 1  The PMR indicator system 
Figure 1. The PMR indicator System
1
Source: Conway et al. (2005)
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Box 1. The low-level PMR indicators 
There are 16 low-level indicators in the PMR system. These indicators cover a wide range of product 
market policies and include:  
 
INWARD-ORIENTED POLICIES 
State control: Public ownership 
  Scope of public enterprises: this indicator measures the pervasiveness of state ownership across 
business sectors as the proportion of sectors in which the state has an equity stake in at least one firm. 
  Size of public enterprise: reflects the overall size of state-owned enterprises relative to the size of the 
economy. 
  Direct control over business enterprises: measures the existence of government special voting rights 
in privately-owned firms, constraints on the sale of state-owned equity stakes, and the extent to which 
legislative bodies control the strategic choices of public enterprises.  
State control: Involvement in business operations 
 Price  controls: reflects the extent of price controls in specific sectors.   7
  Use of command and control regulation: indicates the extent to which government uses coercive (as 
opposed to incentive-based) regulation in general and in specific service sectors. 
Barriers to entrepreneurship: Regulatory and administrative opacity  
  Licenses and permits systems: reflects the use of ‘one-stop shops’ and ‘silence is consent’ rules for 
getting information on and issuing licenses and permits. 
  Communication and simplification of rules and procedures: reflects aspects of government’s 
communication strategy and efforts to reduce and simplify the administrative burden of interacting 
with government. 
Barriers to entrepreneurship: Administrative burden on corporations 
  Administrative burdens for corporations: measures the administrative burdens on the creation of 
corporations.
3 
  Administrative burdens for sole proprietors: measures the administrative burdens on the creation of 
sole proprietor firms.
4 




Barriers to entrepreneurship: Barriers to competition 
  Legal barriers: measures the scope of explicit legal limitations on the number of competitors allowed 
in a wide range of business sectors. 
  Antitrust exemptions: measures the scope of exemptions to competition law for public enterprises. 
Barriers to trade and investment: Explicit barriers  
 Tariffs: calculated as the (simple) average of most-favoured-nation tariffs.  
 Foreign  Ownership  barriers: reflects legal restrictions on foreign acquisition of equity in public and 
private firms and in the telecommunications and airlines sectors. 
  Discriminatory procedures: reflects the extent of discrimination against foreign firms at the 
procedural level. 
Barriers to trade and investment: Regulatory barriers  
  Regulatory barriers: reflects other barriers to international trade (e.g. international harmonisation, 
mutual recognition agreements). 
_______________________________ 
Source: reproduced from Conway, Janod and Nicoletti, 2005 
 
The indicators are calculated on the basis of the qualitative and quantitative information 
obtained from questionnaire answers.  Qualitative data are assigned a numerical value 
that allows ordering each of the possible responses to a given question.  Quantitative 
information is ranked by subdividing it into categories based on a system of thresholds.  
The coded information is then normalized over a scale of zero to six.  These data are then 
                                                 
3 Data from Doing Business in 2005 was used to construct this indicator.  
4 This indicator is not available for Bulgaria as information about it was not included in the adapted 
questionnaire for Bulgaria.   8
aggregated into basic or ‘low-level’ indicators by assigning subjective weights to the 
various regulatory requirements.  Given the normalization of the basic data, all the low-




Basic indicators are then aggregated into broader regulatory domains.  Higher-level 
indicators are calculated as weighted averages of their constituent lower-level indicators.  
The attribution of lower-level indicators to each higher-level indicator, and the weights 
used in the aggregation, are based on principal component analysis (Nicoletti et al., 
1999).  At the highest level of aggregation the overall indicator of product market 
regulation summarizes the restrictiveness of the regulatory framework in the product 
market.  The structure of the PMR system, with progressive levels of aggregation, has the 
advantage of allowing a decomposition of higher-level indicators, with an increasing 
degree of detail, into the values of the more disaggregated indicators, each corresponding 
to specific regulatory provisions. 
 
Data refer to the beginning of 2006 for Bulgaria and Romania, to end-2003 for OECD 
countries and 2004 for Brazil. 
 
As to benchmarks, the most obvious ones for Bulgaria are Romania, for which estimation 
of PMR indicators has been carried out in parallel with Bulgaria and refers to 2006, and 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that are also OECD members: these include 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic and we refer to them as the 
OECD CEE.  The fact that the data for the OECD CEE are from 2003, when these 
countries were at about the same point as Bulgaria in 2006 relative to their accession to 
the EU, makes them interesting benchmarks.  Nevertheless, when assessing Bulgaria’s 
relative performance, it should be kept in mind that the OECD CEE countries have made 
further substantial progress in various areas of product market regulation since EU 
accession in 2004.  
 
Extension of the benchmarking exercise to Brazil, Mexico and Turkey offers a broader 
perspective on other middle income countries (MICs) with different historical 
experiences.  Finally, comparison with the OECD or high income EU15 countries helps 
identify longer term objectives for policymakers.
6   
 
These benchmarks are used in the graphs.  However, Bulgaria’s score relative to the full 
sample of countries (30 OECD members plus Brazil) is shown in Appendix I for all PMR 





                                                 
5 The calculation of low-level indicators, including the weights used, is based on Conway et al. (2005). 
6 EU15 countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.   9
BENCHMARKING PRODUCT MARKET POLICIES IN BULGARIA 
 
In the aftermath of the 1996-1997 crisis Bulgaria pursued an ambitious reform effort, 
stimulated by the prospect of EU accession.  Macroeconomic stability was established as 
a result of prudent fiscal and income policies centered on a Currency Board Arrangement.  
Fiscal consolidation reduced the overall fiscal deficit from 15.2 percent of GDP in 1996 
to a balanced budget in 2003 and fiscal surpluses thereafter while public debt level 
declined from over 100 percent of GDP in 1997 to currently 27 percent.  As a result of 
these policies and deep structural reforms, average growth reached about 5 percent per 
year in 2000-05 (and is estimated at close to 6.5 percent in 2006) and inflation has 
declined to single digits from hyperinflation levels.  Unemployment also declined from 
18 percent in 2000 to 8 percent currently. 
 
Solid macroeconomic performance supported by accelerated structural reforms improved 
the environment for doing business in Bulgaria.  The private sector’s share in the 
economy increased substantially and is now comparable to, and in some cases even 
higher, than among other EU new member states (NMS).  Domestic investment surged to 
close to 30 percent of GDP in 2006 compared to less than 10 percent in 1996-1997 while 
foreign direct investment has averaged 13 percent over the last four years.  Beginning in 
1998, most of the non-infrastructure enterprises and banks were privatized or liquidated, 
banking restructuring was completed and banking supervision strengthened; trade and 
prices were liberalized; reforms in the energy sectors were implemented in both the 
district heating and electricity sectors; major public sector and institutional reforms have 
been implemented.  Steps were also taken to reform the regulatory framework.   
Nevertheless, important aspects of the regulatory environment still need to be improved, 
both in terms of the quality of the rules and regulations, and of their efficient 
enforcement.  
 
A crucial element of the second generation of reforms to be pursued by Bulgaria is the 
implementation of less restrictive product market policies, which will encourage a more 
efficient allocation of resources and improve labor productivity.  This is especially 
important for Bulgaria given the significant income and productivity gaps the country has 
with other EU members: Bulgaria joined the EU with an estimated per capita income 
level of about 35% of the average for EU25, the lowest among the new member states.
7  
In addition, employment and participation rates, albeit improving substantially recently, 
remain among the lowest in the EU.  
 
Enhancing competition in product markets has been found to help increase GDP per 
capita by providing incentives to firms to reallocate resources to more productive 
activities, increase innovation and technological diffusion.  In addition, less restrictive 
regulations may positively affect employment by reducing the rents that some firms 
extract from overregulation and force firms to expand their activities.
8 
 
                                                 
7 Eurostat projection. 
8 See Conway, Janod, Nicolletti (2005).   10
Benchmarking product market 
regulation has proved to be a useful tool 
for monitoring the performance of 
policies and institutions in OECD 
countries and for identifying specific 
policy gaps, thus offering the 
opportunity to benefit from the 
experience of other member states.  Two 
surveys have been conducted so far 
collecting data for 1998 and 2003.     
Results from these surveys point to a 
convergence in product market policies 
across OECD countries, with substantial 
improvements achieved by countries that 
originally exhibited relatively restrictive 
product market regulations, such as 
Poland, Turkey, Czech Republic, 
Greece, Italy, France, Mexico, Korea, 
Hungary, and Spain ( 
Figure 2)  Substantial improvements in 
easing product market policies have also 
been achieved among EU15 countries 
where the average PMR score fell from 
2.1 in 1998 to 1.4 in 2003.  While this 
reflects the increasing harmonization of 
EU common market rules, the PMR 
benchmarking may have been 
instrumental in fostering this 
improvement.   
 
Figure 2. Product Market Regulation among 
OECD countries, a comparison between 1998 
and 2003 


































Source: Conway, Janod, Nicoletti 2005.     
Note:  A lower figure indicates a better 
performance. 
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Product market policies, as measured by the overall summary product market indicator, 
are still relatively restrictive in Bulgaria compared to those of OECD countries.  Simple 
comparisons suggest Bulgaria still scores less well than the EU 15 average, although 
better than many of its peers did in 2003 (Figure 3).  Figure 4, which reports the summary 
PMR scores accounting for the uncertainty in the choice of weights used in the PMR 
system, confirms that Bulgaria falls into the group of relatively restrictive countries 
(which includes France, Greece, Italy and the Czech Republic as estimated with 2003 
data).
9   
 
 



































Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see appendix I.   
 
 












































Note: Values refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and Romania and 2003 for all other countries. 
                                                 
9 See Conway, Janod, Nicolletti (2005) for details.   12
The confidence intervals are calculated using stochastic weights on the low-level indicators to generate a 
distribution of overall PMR indicators for each country. The 90 per cent confidence intervals are calculated 
from that distribution. Indicator values for the 'relatively liberal' and 'relatively restrictive' countries are 
significantly different at the 90 percent level of confidence (Conway, Janod, Nicoletti, 2005). 
 
In order to identify the sources of restrictiveness of product market regulation, the 
indicator may be decomposed into the broad categories of inward-oriented policies and 
outward-oriented policies.  The former include policies and regulations that determine 
the degree of state control and barriers to entrepreneurship, while the latter reflect 
policies and regulations that affect barriers to trade and investment.  A detailed 
description of what the indicators measure follows in the next sections. 
 
Compliance with the acquis communautaire for EU accession and membership of the 
WTO has an important impact on both inward- and outward-oriented policies.  EU 
legislation must eventually be fully implemented in a wide range of domains as a 
precondition to participating in the EU-wide single market for goods and services.   
Nonetheless, greater reform challenges, as well as greater cross-country variation, lie 
with the regulations that fall under the category of inward-oriented policies.  Indeed, 
while implementation of the acquis communautaire is certainly reflected in certain 
aspects of the inward regulatory framework in Bulgaria (e.g. competition policy), many 
areas are still subject to a large degree of domestic discretion.   
 
Thus, average scores are lower (less restrictive) across the board for outward-oriented 
policies than for inward-oriented ones.  This is certainly due to the requirements that are 
imposed by international agreements - such as the WTO charters, and, for EU countries, 
membership in the European Union - which are more binding in matters concerning trade 
and foreign direct investment.  Within this general picture, it appears, nonetheless, that 
Bulgaria performs relatively better with respect to outward-oriented policies (Figure 5). 
   13
Figure 5. Inward- and outward-oriented policies 












































Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see appendix I.   
 
 
1. Outward-oriented policies 
Compliance with international commitments may more easily impose discipline on 
policymakers.  Indeed, this probably explains why all country groups do better on 
average in their outward-oriented policies ratings than in the inward-oriented one.  In the 
case of Bulgaria, observance and implementation of the rules for membership of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and, even more strongly, the European Union (EU) 
has led it to significantly reduce barriers to trade and investment since the start of 
transition. Bulgaria’s foreign trade policy has been driven most of all by the 
commitments of the EU Eastern Enlargement project, promoting bilateral trade 
liberalization initially with the EU and EFTA and, subsequently, with other preferential 
partners of the EU.  The Pan-European Agreement on the Cumulation of the Rules of 
Origin combined with the removal of tariffs on all industrial products and the 
harmonization of technical standards has led to Bulgaria’s participation in a de facto free 
trade area for industrial products (World Bank, 2005). 
 
As a testament to Bulgaria’s success in this respect, foreign direct investment net inflows 
increased from 6% of GDP in 2001 to 16.5% in 2006, while trade in goods and services 
expanded from 119% to 149% of GDP in the same period.  FDI has gone to a variety of 
sectors, notably manufacturing, financial sector, trade, and transport, and has amply made 
up for the expanding external current account deficit, which is expected to exceed 13% of 
GDP in 2006.  Looking forward, strong FDI inflows will be instrumental in ensuring 
continued macroeconomic stability and productivity growth.  Therefore, continued 
improvements in the business environment remains critical.    
   14

























Source: WIIW and Eurostat 
*Data for Bulgaria refer to 2003-05 
Source: Eurostat 
*Data for Bulgaria refer to 2003-05 
 
Examining the various component indicators of outward-oriented policies sheds light on 
the sources of the gap between Bulgaria and OECD CEE countries.  These include 
explicit barriers to trade and foreign investments such as tariffs, discriminatory 
procedures against foreign firms and foreign ownership barriers, as well as regulatory 
barriers such as the absence of international harmonization or mutual recognition 
agreements.   
 
While Bulgaria has achieved best practice standards in incorporating in legislation the 
principle of non-discrimination against foreign parties and has eliminated all other 
regulatory barriers to trade and investment (discussed in 1.3), progress can still be made 
in terms of tariffs and remaining obstacles to foreign investments.  
 
1.1 Tariffs 
First generation reforms rapidly succeeded in eliminating all quantitative restrictions and 
the state monopoly over foreign trade (Kaminski, 2006) and the EU Eastern Enlargement 
project rapidly led to Bulgaria’s participation in a European free trade area.  As a result 
Bulgaria’s tariff levels (measured here as MFN tariffs on industrial goods) are much 
lower in 2006 than those of comparator middle income countries and even slightly lower 
than some of the pre-accession OECD CEE (Figure 8).  In particular, Hungary and 
Poland entered the EU with substantially higher tariff levels than Bulgaria’s in 2006.  In 
addition, Bulgaria’s tariff levels have been lowered to those of the EU common market as 
of its entry into the EU as of January 1, 2007. 
   15























OECD Bulgaria Hungary Poland MICs Romania
 
Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see appendix I.   
 
1.2 Barriers to foreign direct investment 
Barriers to foreign direct investment include foreign ownership barriers, discriminatory 
procedures against foreign firms, and other barriers to trade and investment, all of which 
are presented in detail below.  One such barrier concerns legal restrictions on foreign 
participation in the equity of domestic firms and in telecommunications and airline 
sectors.  In this regard, Bulgaria does not compare well with high income EU countries, 
or with pre-accession CEE countries and other MICs ( 
Figure 9).   
 
Foreign ownership barriers take the form of statutory or other legal limits to the 
proportion of shares that can be acquired by foreign investor or of special voting rights 
that can be exercised in case of acquisition of equity by foreign investors.  Such 
restriction may apply in general or be limited to specific sectors that are considered 
‘strategic’ such as air transport, telecommunications, and electricity generation.  
 
Bulgaria fares relatively poorly in this respect mostly because of general ownership 
barriers – which in Bulgaria actually apply to domestic and not just foreign investors.  
(Barriers in specific sectors are in line with those in the EU - for example the 49% 
foreign ownership ceiling in the airlines sector is standard across EU countries.)    
   16























Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see appendix I.   
 
This is therefore consistent with the finding that Bulgaria does not discriminate against 
foreign firms (Figure 10).  The rights of foreign firms in Bulgaria to appeal and redress 
through competition agencies, regulatory bodies, trade policy bodies, or private rights of 
action is equal to those of domestic firms.   
 





















Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see appendix I.   
 
1.3 Regulatory barriers to trade and investment 
 
Bulgaria has also completely eliminated other regulatory barriers to trade and investment.  
These barriers include the absence of mutual recognition agreements with other countries 
such as specific provisions which require regulators to recognize regulatory measures 
performed in other countries; to use internationally harmonized standards and 
certification procedures; or avoid unnecessary trade restrictiveness.  In this respect, 
Bulgaria has, in fact, achieved best practice (Figure 11).   17
 
Figure 11. Regulatory barriers to trade and investment 



















Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see appendix I.   
 
 
2. Inward-oriented policies 
Inward-oriented policies in the PMR system can be decomposed into two broad 
categories: indicators of state control and barriers to entrepreneurship (Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12. State control and barriers to entrepreneurship 
a. Barriers to entrepreneurship  b. State control 
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Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see appendix I.   
 
Bulgaria performs very well with respect to barriers to entrepreneurship.  Priorities 
concerning inward policies clearly lie with state control.  The legacy of central planning 
is still visible in CEE countries, since they perform comparatively worse than all other 
groups, although Euro zone countries, with a tradition of heavy state involvement in the 
economy, present not much lower values.
10  As a general trend, most of the OECD 
countries that had relatively restrictive policies in 1998 have succeeded in reducing the 
                                                 
10 See Tables in the Annex.   18
extent of state control in 2003 by removing price controls and reducing reliance on 
coercive - as opposed to incentive-based - regulations.  
 
2.1 Barriers to entrepreneurship 
Barriers to entrepreneurship include barriers to competition, regulatory and 
administrative opacity and administrative burdens on start-ups.  These are discussed in 
turn below.   
 
2.1.1 Barriers to competition  
 
Bulgaria scores better than the EU average in terms of barriers to competition (as 
measured by license and permit requirements or antitrust exemptions).  It also 
outperforms other MICs (Figure 13).  This is largely due to Bulgaria’s diligence in 
incorporating EU rules and best practices in national legislation.  This resulted in the 
elimination of antitrust exemptions for state-owned enterprises (Campeanu et al., 2003).  
In this regard Bulgaria fares very well and even better than EU15 and the average for the 
OECD countries.  
 
Bulgaria also compares well in terms of other legal barriers to competition, such as 
explicit legal limitations on the number of competitors allowed in certain business 
sectors.  Bulgaria still maintains some legal restrictions to entry in network and utilities 
sectors (air transport infrastructure; collection, purification and distribution of water; 
electricity generation, transmission, distribution and supply; and gas production, 
transmission, distribution and supply) but these are fairly standard among other OECD 
and EU countries. 
 
Figure 13. Barriers to competition 
a. Legal barriers (licenses and permit 
requirements)   











































Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see appendix I.   
 
2.1.2 Regulatory and Administrative Opacity  
 
Important progress has been made since 2002 in streamlining licensing regimes at the 
national level.  A program for optimization of the centrally managed regulatory regimes   19
for licensing, permission and registration has been implemented.  As a result 85 percent 
of the regulatory regimes slated for optimization were modified or eliminated.  In 
addition, a Law on Administrative Regulation and Administrative Control on Economic 
Activities was enacted to control the development of future licensing regimes.  The law 
establishes the principle that new regulation can only be passed with parliamentary 
approval; that new regulatory regimes are limited to the initiative of line ministries and 
other government agencies; and requires new regulation to be accompanied by an 
assessment of compliance cost.  Specific guidelines were issued to central and municipal 
bodies on the design of proposed new regulatory regimes, including the identification and 
measurement of costs and benefits, and the establishment of a process by which new 
regimes evolve appropriately from concept to implementation.   
 
Figure 14: Regulatory and Administrative Opacity 
















































Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see appendix I.   
 
The achievements in the simplification of licenses and permits requirements are visible in 
the levels of regulatory and administrative opacity, where Bulgaria compares well with 
benchmark groups, ranking as well as or better than the EU 15 or the OECD (Figure 
14a).
11  These achievements are also reflected in the fact that businesses in Bulgaria now 
perceive licenses and permits as less of a problem for doing business than in 2002 (Figure 
15). 
 
                                                 
11 Note that, since accession, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic have 
continued progressing with their reform agenda implying that the gap between these countries today and 
Bulgaria is larger than what the 2003 data suggest.  For instance, in January 2004, Poland enacted a Law on 
Economic Freedom, reducing the number of licensing regimes from 9  to 5 and  introducing the ‘silence is 
consent rule’ in business registration and in various areas administrative regulation.    20
Figure 15. Business Licenses as a Problem for Doing Business (percent of firms indicating business 
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2002 2005
 
Source: EBRD-WB BEEPS, 2005.   
 
Bulgaria also fares well in terms of communication and simplification of rules and 
procedures (Figure 14b) compared to OECD countries.  The indicator captures aspects of 
the government’s communication strategy and its efforts to reduce and simplify the 
administrative burden of interacting with government.  
 
Bulgaria has implemented a number of reforms to improve the communication of rules 
and procedures to affected parties.  The Law on Normative Acts was amended in 2003 to 
require that all affected parties be notified through mass media or representative 
associations prior to the approval of new regulation by Parliament.  In addition, the Law 
on Administrative Regulation and Administrative Control on Economic Activities 
requires that the rationale and the regulatory impact evaluation for a draft legislation that 
introduces licensing or registration regime, is posted on the web or released publicly.  
Affected parties have the right to comment on the proposed regulation.  Consultations on 
new legislation are organized with business associations or interested groups and some of 
the new regulations are discussed at the sessions of the Council for Economic Growth
12.  
The Law on Normative Acts also requires the use of plain language when drafting of 
rules and regulations.  
 
Reforms aimed at simplification of rules and procedures also took off in 2003 with a 
completed count of all centrally mandated licenses and permits and clearly defined rules 
and responsibilities for their optimization.  Further steps could include the simplification 
of sector-specific regimes and the extension to the municipal level of rules such as 
‘silence is consent’ for business registration and licensing.   
 
2.1.3 Administrative Burdens on Start-Ups 
 
                                                 
12 A consultative body established in 2002 under the Council of Ministers that consists of representatives of 
businesses, and ministers of economy and energy, finance, transport, regional development, and labor and 
social policy.     21
Over the past several years, Bulgaria has made some progress in promoting a business 
friendly regulatory environment. This is reflected in the World Bank’s Doing Business 
reports showing Bulgaria’s overall ranking for the summary indicator for “ease of doing 
business” improving from 59
th to 54
th between 2005 and 2006.
13 Bulgaria’s relative 
position in the sub-indicator for “starting a business” is somewhat worse, although up 
from 91
st in 2005 to 85
th out of  75 economies in 2006. A closer look at the components 
of this indicator reveals that Bulgaria still lags behind comparator countries for the 
number of steps entrepreneurs can expect to go through to launch; the time it takes on 
average; and the cost and minimum capital required as a percentage of gross national 
income (GNI) per capita (Table 1).
14 
 
 Table 1.  Starting a business in 2006: Component indicators   
  
  
Bulgaria  Romania Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Poland Slovak 
Republic 
OECD EU15 
Procedures (number)  9  5 10  6 10  9  6.9  6.9 
Time (days)  32  11 24  38 31  25  19.3  19.7 
Cost (% of income per 
capita) 
7.9  4.4 8.9 20.9  21.4  4.8  8.4  6.3 
Min. capital (% of 
income per capita) 
91.3  0 36.8  74.2  204.4  39.1  52.4  33.9 
Source: Doing Business 2007.   
 
These achievements reflect efforts underway to ease the administrative burden on firms.  
In the beginning of 2006, the National Revenue Agency started an operation that 
integrates the collection of taxes and social contribution with a view to reducing the 
taxpayer compliance burden.  Other activities are being implemented to simplify and ease 
reporting requirements for taxpayers, particularly for start-ups.  In 2006 a Law on 
Commercial Registry was enacted that transfers the responsibility for business 
registration from judicial courts to a special enlistment agency, thus transforming 
business registration into an administrative process.  However, the start of the new 
agency has been postponed to July 2007.   
 
Nevertheless, the PMR indicators show that administrative burdens are still an issue for 
specific service sectors, such as road transport and retail distribution (Figure 16). These 
sector specific administrative burdens assess the restrictiveness of licensing, registration 
and notification requirements, as well as technical, health and safety standards, 
 
                                                 
13 The summary “Ease of doing business” indicator is constructed from the following components: Starting 
a Business, Dealing with Licenses, Employing Workers, Registering Property, Getting Credit, Protecting 
Investors, Paying Taxes, Trading Across Borders, Enforcing Contracts, Closing a Business. 
14  The PMR indicator for “administrative burdens on start-ups” shows an even better positioning of 
Bulgaria relative to OECD countries. Nonetheless, some caution is in order given that, due to data 
availability, the underlying components were estimated relying on a different methodology to the one used 
for OECD countries. Values for Bulgaria and Romania were obtained based on Doing Business 2005 data. 
Since Doing Business information on number of procedures, number of days and cost connected with 
starting a company are not directly comparable to the same information in the OECD International 
Regulation Database, a normalization process was necessary to homogenize the scores obtained.  See 
Annex Table A2.8 for details.    22

























Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see appendix I.   
 
 
2.2 State control of economic activity  
The degree of state control in the business sector has decreased substantially in Bulgaria 
since 1998.  In the aftermath of the 1996-1997 crisis an ambitious program of 
macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms placed Bulgaria on the course to EU 
accession.  A crucial element of the reform package was the substantial reduction of the 
state’s presence in the economy.  Between 1998 and 2002, most of the non-infrastructure 
enterprises and banks were privatized, thus reducing both the size and the scope of the 
public presence in the business sector.  Currently, about 60 percent of all state-owned 
enterprises (valued at end-1995 prices), and 91 percent of all assets slated for 
privatization, have been privatized.  At the same time, extensive price liberalization 
reduced the role of the state in many services. 
 
The two measures of state control in the PMR system are public ownership and state 
involvement in business operations (through price controls and coercive, as opposed to 
incentive-based, regulation).  A look at Figure 17 reveals that Bulgaria still remains quite 
far from OECD and EU levels with respect to both indicators, although it is on par with 
the pre-accession CEE (with the exception of the Slovak Republic).  
 
 
Figure 17. Public ownership and state involvement in business operation 





















































Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey.  Values refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see appendix I.   
 
2.2.1 Public ownership 
 
The aggregate indicator for public ownership covers size and scope of public enterprise 
sector, as well as direct control over business enterprises.  Given that there is much 
variation among EU15 or OECD countries for these indicators, we show the full set of 
comparators (Figure 18).  The figure suggests the size and scope of the public sector in 
Bulgaria is fairly standard (although within the upper tier), while state control of public 
enterprises remains more extensive.  
   24
Figure 18 Public ownership: size, scope and extent of control over public enterprises 
 











































































































































































































































































































































































Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see appendix I.   
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The Bulgarian public enterprise sector remains important as a share of GDP.
15  However, 
it is still smaller than that of a number of EU15 countries such as Austria, France, Italy, 
Greece and Norway.  As to its scope, it is also wide given that the Bulgarian state holds 
equity in the largest firm in 14 out of 23 sectors of the economy.
16  This however, places 
Bulgaria very close to the OECD average, and appears to be fairly standard (Figure 18b).   
As to the instruments of control used by the Bulgarian state in the sectors where it 
remains involved, they seem more extensive than in most benchmark countries (Figure 
18c).  The similarity with Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic suggests that 
transition countries have followed a similar approach in this domain.  Direct control over 
business enterprises in Bulgaria has taken the form of constraints to the sales of state-
owned equity stakes, special voting rights, and, to a lesser extent, control of the strategic 
choices of public enterprises by legislative bodies (see Annex Table A2.3 for details). 
 
2.2.2 State Involvement in Business Operation 
 
State intervention in the overall economy is captured through price controls and “use of 
command and control regulations.”  The price control indicator measures the existence of 
price regulation or administrative control of prices in air travel, road freight, 
telecommunications, and retail distribution sectors.  The “use of command-and-control” 
indicator reflects the extent to which government uses prescriptive (as opposed to 
incentive-based) regulation both in general and in specific service sectors.
  
 
Figure 19: State involvement in business operations 
a. Price controls  b. Use of command-and-control regulation 
0.4














































Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Bulgaria 
and Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see appendix I.   
 
 
                                                 
15 This was calculated following the PMR methodology.  As its base, it uses an indicator of the size of the 
public enterprise sector taken from the Freedom of the World Indicators (Gwartney and Lawson 1997).  
This base indicator value is then adjusted each year based on the extent of privatization proceeds as a share 
of GDP using a perpetual inventory type approach (see Appendix table A2.2) for more details.  
16 The indicator does not into account the number of shares or the proportion of state ownership.  In 
Bulgaria, for examples, state ownership in some of the sectors is 1%.       26
Price controls have been largely removed since the first phase of transition (Kaminski, 
2006), although Bulgaria still score well above the OECD and EU (Figure 19)
17.  In 
addition, reliance on prescriptive regulation is much more pronounced than in all 
comparator groups, although it is similar to Poland’s and the MICs 2003 average and 





A detailed look at the make-up of this indicator shows that Bulgaria’s very high (poor) 
score is almost entirely driven by the fact that regulators are not required to consider 
alternative instruments before issuing new regulations, and no guidance has been issued 
concerning the use of alternatives to traditional (Box 2).  
 
Bulgaria performs very well on the other components of this indicator, which measure the 
use of prescriptive regulation in the specific sectors included in the PMR approach (air 
travel, road freight, railways and retail distribution).  Universal service requirement for 
                                                 
17 By the time the report was finalized, prices of tobacco have already been liberalized.  Since August 2006, 
prices of all tobacco products, including cigarettes, are subject only to registration regime.     
Box 2 What the PMR survey means by “command and control” regulation 
 
The contrasting use of  “command-and-control” and “incentive-based” regulation appear to have been 
brought into common usage by Schultze who wrote in a 1977 lecture about economic efficiency: “We 
tend to see only one way of intervening – namely removing a set of decision from the decentralized and 
incentive-oriented private market and transferring them to the command-and-control techniques of 
government bureaucracy” (page 6) 
 
In this context, the PMR attempts to measure the extent to which the cost of new regulation is assessed, 
and whether alternatives are considered before implementing new regulations.  About half of the 
indicator weights are allocated to the following two questions (the full make-up of the indicator is 
provided in Annex table A2.5):  
 
Regulators are required to assess alternative policy instruments (regulatory and non-regulatory) 
before adopting new regulation. (Current answer: no). 
 
Explanation.  The use of a wide range of mechanisms for meeting policy goals, not just traditional 
regulatory controls, helps to ensure that the most efficient and effective approaches are used. Approaches 
may include green taxes and subsidies, voluntary agreements, information programs such as eco labeling, 
self-regulation, permit-trading schemes, and performance-based regulation (where a sector or industry 
must comply with a standard but can broadly choose how to meet it).  Note that the question only refers 
to whether the obligation exists as a specific provision in a specific legislative act, not whether the spirit 
of it is in fact respected.   A positive answer to the question would require the existence of a normative 
act explicitly ruling out regulation as the default option  
 
Guidance has been issued on using alternatives to traditional regulation. (Current answer: no). 
 
Explanation.  The regulatory process is governed by a standard procedure, outlining the steps to be taken 
to issue new regulation. For instance, the procedure may include binding ex ante regulatory impact 
assessment (RIA).  Box 2 offers a discussion of alternatives to traditional regulation. 
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railways (which is standard) is the only command-and-control regulation picked up by 




Over the last years, Bulgaria has implemented substantial structural reforms on many 
fronts, including in improving the regulatory environment for doing business.  As a 
result, it is now performing as well or better than the average for the OECD on a number 
of indicators.  As shown in Figure 20, Bulgaria has been very successful in reducing 
barriers to trade and investment, and in eliminating regulatory barriers and discriminatory 
procedures against foreign investors.  Tariffs were above the OECD average in 2006 but 
are now in line with EU rules.  With respect to barriers to entrepreneurship, Bulgaria has 
managed to eliminate a number of them (such as antitrust exemptions) or is on par with 
the OECD average for several others (licenses and permits, and legal barriers to 
competition).    
 
Figure 20 Indicators in which Bulgaria performs as well as the OECD average (or is about to): 
















Legal barriers to competition 
Communication and simplification of
rules and procedures




However, an important agenda lies ahead if Bulgaria is to continue eliminating barriers to 
entrepreneurship and further reduce state control (Figure 21).  
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Direct control over business
enterprises




In fact, the Bulgarian state continues to exercise a greater amount of control over the 
economy than is the norm among OECD countries – at least as measured by the PMR 
approach.  The size and scope of the public sector are above the average, yet the two 
indicators that standout concern the extent of direct control over business enterprises and 
the use of command-and-control (as opposed to incentive-based) regulation.  (Table A2. 
3 and Table A2. 5 show the detailed composition of these indicators).  Actions to 
improve Bulgaria’s performance on both counts could include:  
•  Increase reliance on incentive-based regulation.  In a narrow sense this 
entails requiring regulators to consider alternatives to any regulation they seek to 
introduce as is now the norm in OECD countries.  More substantively, this 
requires changing the regulatory and administrative culture so that new regulation 
is not the default option to modify economic behavior.  Among other things, this 
will require providing guidance and training on what may constitute valid 
alternatives to regulation (Box ).   
•  Reduce control over business enterprises in which the state has 
interest.  As shown in Table A2. 3, the practice of holding golden shares has been 
eliminated by the majority of OECD countries.  Of those that still have golden 
shares, only about half use them to affect strategic decisions of firms, as is still the 
case in Bulgaria.  More generally, responses to the PMR questionnaire suggest 
that the strategic choices of publicly controlled firms have to be reviewed or 
cleared by a national or sub-national legislature.  This practice has now been 
abandoned by about half the countries in the OECD.   29
 
And while Bulgaria has made great stride in improving its business environment, it is still 
not at the OECD average.  Particular areas in need of further attention are:  
•  Further reducing administrative burdens, overall and sector specific. 
In general, implementation of the new business registry would further streamline 
and simplify business registration.  At the same time, easing off the licensing and 
registration regimes for retail distribution of food and clothing would also help 
reduce burdens on businesses. 
•  Improve communication of rules and procedures to the affected 
parties  by extending the program for optimization of licensing and permits 
system to municipalities and revisiting the effectiveness of the program at central 
government level.     
 
Finally, it should be noted once more that the PMR methodology does not capture 
implementation or common practices associated with the rules and regulations it 
measures.  Bulgaria has made impressive strides towards the enactment of rules and 
regulations that are less restrictive of competition.  However, for this progress to be 
reflected in an improved business environment, government policy in years to come will 
need to be directed towards ensuring effective implementation and enforcement.      30
 
Box 3: Alternative Regulatory approaches 
 
Performance-Based Regulations—specify required outcomes or objectives rather than the means by 
which they must be achieved.  Thus firms and individuals can choose processes that are more efficient 
and less costly, which promotes the use of new technology on a broader scale.  Such type of regulation 
is increasingly used in health, safety, consumer protection, and environmental regulation.  Drawbacks 
include measurement problems related to desired outcomes, higher administrative and monitoring costs, 
greater responsibilities for small companies to develop appropriate compliance strategies.  Most 
countries have resorted to the use of guidelines or “safe harbors” in conjunction with performance-
based regulation.  Guidelines provide information on appropriate compliance strategies, while safe 
harbors allow the benefits of certainty of compliance associated with prescriptive regulation to be 
attained, while also allowing more innovative firms to take advantage of the benefits of such regulation. 
Process Based Regulations—require businesses to develop processes that systematically control and 
minimize production risks. These processes are used in businesses with multiple and complex sources 
of risk, where ex post testing of the product is either ineffective or expensive.  Process based regulation 
is predominantly used in health, food safety, and environmental regulation.   
Co-regulation—businesses take the lead in regulation through endorsement and adherence to codes of 
practice.  This type of regulation is highly cost effective for the government.  Drawbacks include the 
possibility for encouraging anti-competitive activities by business or professional organizations.   
Economic Instruments—taxes, subsidies, tradable permits, vouchers and the like.  Economic 
instruments allow businesses to achieve regulatory goals in the least costly manner and provide market 
incentives which reward the use of innovation and technical change. 
Information and Education—most widely used approach to regulation in OECD member states; 
empower consumers to adopt actions or make informed choices to change their behavior.  Examples 
include campaigns aimed at reducing speeding when driving, anti-litter behaviors; reducing the use of 
drinking water; eco-labeling of products. 
Guidelines—issued by regulatory authorities, setting out processing or providing interpretations to aid 
understanding of government objectives by businesses and citizens.  Guidelines may accompany 
existing regulations, but also are increasingly used as stand-alone documents.  Guidelines, for example, 
are widely used in the area of consumer protection in Denmark.   
Voluntary Approaches—initiated by industries, sometimes formally sanctioned or endorsed by 
government.  They include voluntary initiatives, voluntary codes, voluntary agreements, and self-
regulation.  An example of a voluntary arrangement is the chemical industry’s Responsible Care 
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ANNEX I: COMPARISONS WITH FULL SAMPLE   34
 









Australia 0.9  0.9  0.9 
United Kingdom  0.9  1.2  0.5 
Iceland 1.0  1.4  0.4 
United States  1.0  1.2  0.8 
Ireland 1.1  1.4  0.6 
Denmark 1.1  1.3  0.9 
New Zealand  1.1  1.3  0.9 
Canada 1.2  1.2  1.2 
Sweden 1.2  1.5  0.9 
Luxembourg 1.3  1.6  0.8 
Japan 1.3  1.5  1.0 
Finland 1.3  1.7  0.8 
Belgium 1.4  2.0  0.5 
Netherlands 1.4  1.8  0.8 
Austria 1.4  1.8  0.8 
Slovak Republic  1.4  1.3  1.5 
Germany 1.4  1.9  0.8 
Norway 1.5  1.9  0.9 
Korea 1.5  1.7  1.3 
Romania 1.6  1.8  1.4 
Portugal 1.6  2.0  0.9 
Spain 1.6  2.1  0.9 
Switzerland 1.7  2.1  1.1 
France 1.7  2.1  1.1 
Czech Republic  1.7  2.2  1.1 
Bulgaria 1.8  2.1  1.4 
Greece 1.8  2.2  1.3 
Italy 1.9  2.3  1.3 
Brazil 1.9  1.8  1.9 
Hungary 2.0  2.4  1.5 
Mexico 2.2  2.1  2.3 
Turkey 2.3  2.6  1.8 
Poland 2.8  2.9  2.5 
 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for 
all other countries (Conway et al. 2005). 
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Table A1. 2 State Control 
 
   State control  Public ownership  Involvement in 
business operation 
Australia  0.6 0.8 0.3 
Iceland  1.1 1.8 0.3 
United  States  1.2 1.2 1.2 
Denmark  1.3 1.7 0.8 
Slovak  Republic  1.4 1.9 0.8 
New  Zealand  1.4 1.9 0.8 
Japan  1.5 0.8 2.4 
Canada  1.7 1.7 1.5 
Korea  1.7 1.8 1.5 
United  Kingdom  1.7 1.9 1.6 
Mexico  1.9 2.3 1.4 
Sweden  1.9 2.2 1.6 
Netherlands  1.9 2.5 1.2 
Austria  1.9 2.2 1.6 
Ireland  2.0 1.8 2.1 
Luxembourg  2.0 2.6 1.2 
Germany  2.2 2.8 1.5 
Switzerland  2.2 2.4 2.1 
Finland  2.3 3.2 1.3 
Belgium  2.4 2.2 2.6 
Brazil  2.4 2.1 2.8 
Czech  Republic  2.5 3.0 1.9 
France  2.7 3.3 1.9 
Spain  2.7 2.7 2.7 
Portugal  2.7 3.1 2.2 
Norway  2.8 3.5 1.8 
Greece  2.8 2.4 3.3 
Turkey  2.8 3.1 2.5 
Romania  3.2 4.1 2.2 
Italy  3.2 3.8 2.3 
Bulgaria  3.2 3.5 2.8 
Hungary  3.3 3.8 2.6 
Poland  3.6 4.2 2.8 
 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for 
all other countries (Conway et al. 2005).   36












Romania 0.5  0.7  0.1  0.6 
United  Kingdom 0.8 0.7 1.2 0.4 
Canada 0.8  0.9  0.5  0.7 
Ireland 0.9  0.5  2.1  0.3 
Norway 1.0  1.0  1.2  0.6 
Sweden 1.1  1.2  1.1  0.6 
Finland 1.1  1.3  1.2  0.4 
Bulgaria 1.1  1.4  1.2  0.4 
Australia 1.1  1.0  1.2  1.5 
New Zealand  1.2  0.8  2.2  0.4 
United States  1.2  1.0  1.3  1.5 
Slovak Republic  1.2  1.9  0.7  0.3 
Luxembourg 1.2  1.8  1.1  0.1 
Denmark 1.2  0.5  2.1  1.7 
Portugal 1.3  1.7  1.2  0.5 
Brazil 1.3  1.5  1.4  0.6 
Italy 1.4  2.4  0.4  0.6 
Japan 1.4  1.9  1.2  0.6 
Hungary 1.4  2.3  0.4  1.1 
Germany 1.6  1.6  2.2  0.5 
Iceland 1.6  1.4  2.4  0.7 
Greece 1.6  2.6 0.6 0.5 
Spain 1.6  2.8  0.4  0.4 
France 1.6  1.9  1.3  1.4 
Belgium 1.6  1.7  2.2  0.6 
Austria 1.6  2.8  0.4  0.8 
Netherlands 1.6  1.6  2.5  0.6 
Korea 1.7  2.2  1.2  1.0 
Switzerland 1.9  1.7  3.1  0.7 
Czech Republic  1.9 2.3 2.3 0.5 
Mexico 2.2  3.1  0.4  2.9 
Poland 2.3  3.7  1.5  0.3 
Turkey 2.5  2.7  3.4  0.5 
 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for 
all other countries (Conway et al. 2005).   37




Barriers to trade and 
investment  Explicit barriers  Other barriers 
Iceland  0.3 0.5 0.1 
Belgium  0.3 0.5 0.1 
United  Kingdom  0.4 0.5 0.2 
Ireland  0.5 0.8 0.2 
Finland  0.6 1.0 0.2 
Germany  0.6 0.6 0.7 
Netherlands  0.7 1.0 0.3 
Spain  0.7 0.7 0.6 
Austria  0.7 1.0 0.2 
Luxembourg  0.7 1.1 0.2 
United  States  0.7 1.1 0.2 
Norway  0.8 0.9 0.6 
Sweden  0.8 1.2 0.3 
Portugal  0.8 1.2 0.3 
Denmark  0.8 1.0 0.7 
New  Zealand  0.8 1.3 0.2 
Australia  0.9 1.4 0.2 
Czech  Republic  0.9 1.4 0.3 
Japan  0.9 1.4 0.3 
France  1.0 1.5 0.3 
Switzerland  1.0 1.5 0.4 
Canada  1.1 1.7 0.4 
Italy  1.1 1.7 0.4 
Greece  1.2 1.4 1.0 
Korea  1.3 1.9 0.4 
Bulgaria  1.3 2.0 0.4 
Romania  1.3 1.9 0.5 
Hungary  1.4 2.1 0.6 
Slovak  Republic  1.6 1.6 1.5 
Turkey  1.7 2.5 0.6 
Brazil  1.9 2.3 1.5 
Mexico  2.4 3.4 1.0 
Poland  2.4 3.0 1.7 
 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for 
all other countries (Conway et al. 2005).   38


















Australia  2.8 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 
Austria  3.5 4.0 0.0 2.2 1.3 
Belgium  1.8 3.3 1.5 4.5 1.0 
Brazil  2.9 0.0 3.0 4.2 1.3 
Bulgaria  3.7 3.5 3.3 3.8 1.4 
Canada  2.8 2.1 0.8 1.3 2.0 
Czech Republic  3.8  3.2 2.3 2.3 1.3 
Denmark  2.5 2.3 0.8 1.4 0.0 
Finland  3.5 3.2 2.9 1.4 0.3 
France  4.5 4.1 1.9 3.0 0.3 
Germany  3.3 3.2 2.3 1.8 0.5 
Greece 3.0  3.8  0.9 5.1 2.3 
Hungary  3.5 3.0 4.8 2.3 2.0 
Iceland  2.3 2.8 0.7 0.0 0.3 
Ireland  2.5 2.6 0.8 3.8 0.8 
Italy  4.5 3.7 3.5 1.9 2.0 
Japan  2.0 0.0 0.6 3.0 2.5 
Korea  2.0 2.8 1.0 1.1 2.0 
Luxembourg  3.5 1.2 2.9 1.5 0.0 
Mexico  3.0 3.6 0.9 1.7 1.0 
Netherlands  2.8 2.8 2.0 1.7 0.3 
New  Zealand  2.3 0.8 2.6 0.8 0.0 
Norway  4.8 4.0 2.4 2.2 0.8 
Poland  5.8 4.6 3.0 3.5 1.6 
Portugal  3.8 1.7 3.8 2.0 1.8 
Romania  2.9 4.8 4.4 2.3 1.1 
Slovak  Republic  1.6 0.0 3.5 0.0 0.4 
Spain  3.5 2.5 2.3 4.4 0.8 
Sweden  3.7 2.7 0.7 2.3 1.0 
Switzerland  3.8 0.9 2.6 1.2 2.6 
Turkey  4.8 4.3 1.0 4.4 0.6 
United  Kingdom  0.8 1.6 2.9 2.3 0.4 
United  States  2.5 0.6 0.8 1.5 0.8 
 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for 
all other countries (Conway et al. 2005).   39






















Austria 0.0  0.5  3.0  3.4  0.3  1.0 
Canada 0.0  1.0  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.6 
Greece 0.0  1.1  2.3 2.9  1.6  0.0 
Hungary 0.0  0.5  2.3  2.0  1.6  0.9 
Italy 0.0  0.5  2.8  2.1  1.9  0.0 
Mexico 0.0  0.3  3.3  3.2  1.9  3.5 
Portugal 0.0  2.6  1.5  1.8  1.4  0.0 
Slovak 
Republic  0.0 1.4  2.0  1.9  0.6  0.0 
Spain 0.0  0.6  2.8  2.4  1.1  0.0 
Romania 0.0  0.1  0.8  0.8  2.0  0.0 
Australia 2.0  0.2  1.3  0.3  1.6  1.5 
Finland 2.0  0.3  1.3  1.1  1.4  0.0 
France 2.0  0.3  2.0  1.6  2.2  1.1 
Japan 2.0  0.3  1.5  2.3  1.4  0.3 
Korea 2.0  0.0  2.7  1.9  1.9  0.6 
Luxembourg 2.0 0.0  2.5  0.3  0.3  0.0 
Norway 2.0  0.2  1.0  0.9  2.2  0.0 
Poland 2.0  0.8  4.3  4.1  0.6  0.0 
Sweden 2.0  0.0  1.0  0.9  2.0  0.0 
United 
Kingdom  2.0 0.2  0.8  0.6  1.4  0.0 
United States  2.0  0.4  0.8  1.0  1.4  1.6 
Brazil 2.0  0.6  0.5  1.3  2.0  0.0 
Bulgaria 2.0  0.3  1.4  1.9  1.1  0.0 
Belgium 4.0  0.3  1.8  1.7  1.6  0.0 
Czech Republic  4.0  0.5 3.0  2.2  1.4 0.0 
Denmark 4.0  0.0  1.0  0.3  1.4  1.9 
Germany 4.0  0.3  2.3  1.4  1.4  0.0 
Iceland 4.0  0.7  1.3  1.6  2.3  0.0 
Ireland 4.0  0.2  0.8  0.3  0.9  0.0 
Netherlands 4.0  0.9  2.0  1.3  1.9  0.0 
New Zealand  4.0  0.3  1.0  0.8  0.3  0.4 
Switzerland 6.0  0.0  2.3  0.8  2.2  0.0 
Turkey 6.0  0.5  2.3  3.2  1.4  0.0 
 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for 
all other countries (Conway et al. 2005).   40
Table A1. 7 Barriers to Trade and Investment: values of the low-level indicators 
 
   Ownership barriers   Discriminatory 
procedures   Regulatory barriers   Tariffs  
Belgium  0.3 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Germany  0.3 0.7 0.7 1.0 
United  Kingdom  0.3 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Romania  0.8 0.0 0.0 5.0 
Spain  0.8 0.3 0.7 1.0 
Iceland  1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Denmark  1.2 0.5 0.7 1.0 
Ireland  1.2 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Netherlands  1.2 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Greece 1.3  2.0 0.7 1.0 
Austria  1.5 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Finland  1.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Luxembourg  1.5 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Sweden  1.5 0.7 0.0 1.0 
Portugal  1.6 0.7 0.0 1.0 
United  States  1.8 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Norway  1.9 0.3 0.7 0.0 
Hungary  1.9 1.2 0.0 3.0 
Brazil  2.0 0.7 1.3 4.0 
Czech Republic  2.0 0.7 0.0 1.0 
Switzerland  2.0 1.1 0.0 1.0 
Korea  2.2 0.0 0.0 3.0 
New  Zealand  2.3 0.0 0.0 1.0 
France  2.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Slovak  Republic  2.3 1.1 1.6 1.0 
Japan  2.4 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Australia  2.4 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Mexico  2.8 1.4 0.0 6.0 
Italy  2.8 0.7 0.0 1.0 
Canada  2.9 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Bulgaria  3.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 
Turkey  3.1 0.7 0.0 3.0 
Poland  3.7 0.3 1.6 4.0 
 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for 
all other countries (Conway et al. 2005). 




ANNEX II: DETAILED RESULTS OF PMR SURVEY FOR BULGARIA 
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p
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c
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w
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e
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c
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c
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i
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R
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c
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c
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c
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r
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r
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r
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e
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p
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i
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